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The rise of populism in the European Union represents a key internal political development 
that is likely to have repercussions on its foreign policy. It is traditionally assumed that, when 
in the opposition, populist parties affect foreign policy debates though not foreign policy 
outcomes. But when they are elected into office, as happened in several EU member states, 
how do they shape policy decisions and processes in EU foreign policy? This policy paper 
argues that although populist actors can be vocal and conspicuous in aligning with external 
actors contesting the international liberal order, they rarely go as far as swaying or blocking 
EU foreign policy decisions and outputs. At the same time, however, populist governments’ 
domestic illiberal policies have the potential to undermine the EU’s legitimacy, structural 
power, and resilience-building endeavours.
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INTRODUCTION
The rise of populism in the European Union (EU) represents a key internal political development 
that is likely to have repercussions on its foreign policy. Previous studies have suggested that, 
when in the opposition, populist parties have affected foreign policy debates though not foreign 
policy outcomes (Balfour 2016).  But the situation might be different when they are elected into 
office. In this context does populism translate into mere rhetorical posturing in EU foreign policy, 
or does it shape policy decisions and processes? This policy paper will show that the rise of pop-
ulism has not, thus far, dramatically affected the substance and process of EU foreign policy. Yet, 
by putting into question the founding norms and principles of democratic governance; by aligning 
rhetorically, economically, or diplomatically with external actors that challenge the international 
liberal order; and by promoting exclusive political processes and social identities, populist parties 
and governments risk undermining EU structural power and resilience-building capacities in the 
long term.
1. POPULISM AND EU FOREIGN POLICY
At its core, populism perceives society as being fundamentally structured by an opposition be-
tween the people and the elite, and promises to conduct politics in the name of the former 
and against the latter (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). The central categories of “people” and 
“elite” can be alternatively defined in moral, economic, cultural, or sociological terms, but the 
former is essentially cast in a positive light (e.g., the people as pure, genuine, or bearers of com-
mon-sense), and the latter in a negative one (e.g., the elite as corrupt, unauthentic, or cosmo-
politan). As an ideology, populism rests on an anti-pluralist interpretation of politics: populists 
consider that they are the only true representatives of the people, and, as such, they view their 
political opponents as inherently illegitimate and intermediary institutions as necessarily sus-
picious (Muller 2016). As a political practice, populism relies on a top-down, personalistic, and 
opportunistic political strategy (Urbinati 2016), as well as on a disruptive and dramatic political 
style (Moffit 2016).
The political logic of populism has several implications for the formulation and conduct of EU 
foreign policy. Populists project the defining “people vs. elite” opposition onto international 
affairs and vow to protect the sovereignty of the people (however the term is defined) (Chrys-
sogelos 2017). This often leads them to align rhetorically with actors who challenge the inter-
national liberal order. Similarly, populists’ anti-pluralism and personalization of power tend to 
lead them to be suspicious of institutionalised foreign policy cooperation (Plagemann and De-
stradi 2019). Finally, the desire to mark a break with elites—whether rhetorically, aesthetically, 
or procedurally—pushes populist actors to engage in “undiplomatic diplomacy” and indulge in 
conspiracy theories, with repercussions for collective foreign policy making (Cadier 2019). No-
tably, this leads most populist actors and movements to castigate the EU for its supranational 


























2. POPULIST ACTORS’ FOREIGN POLICY 
PREFERENCES: RADICAL OR INCHOATE? 
While populism can be understood as a political ideology, it does not seem to translate into 
distinctive, shared, or revolutionary ideas about foreign policy. In fact, many populist parties are 
rather disinterested in international politics, and very few articulate a clear vision or strategy in 
this regard. For instance, ANO, the party of the current Czech Prime Minister, had no section 
on foreign policy in its political program when it was elected to parliament in 2013, while that 
of the Five Star Movement (M5S) in the 2018 Italian elections was thin and vague. More gen-
erally, populist parties tend not to adopt similar positions on international affairs (Verbeek and 
Zaslove 2017). Contrary to what is generally expected of populist actors, Jean-Luc Melenchon’s 
France Insoumise (LFI) is in favour of welcoming refugees; the Netherland’s Pim Fortuyn was a 
supporter of both of European integration and international free-trade agreements; and Poland’s 
Law and Justice (PiS) Party stands among the European political parties most critical of Russia. 
Still, there are signposts where populist actors have been active and vocal—both at the national 
level and in the European Parliament—and where they have directly impacted EU external action. 
Migration is a paragon of this: the populist governments of Hungary and Poland forcefully and 
systematically opposed EU relocation schemes for refugees or asylum seekers, which overrode 
the possibility of a common EU response to the 2015 migration crisis. There again, however, 
these positions appeared to be primarily grounded in domestic posturing and hardly translated 
into a coherent policy vision. The diplomatic alliance between the then Italian Interior Minister, 
Matteo Salvini, and Hungary’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, regardless of their antagonistic posi-
tions on the relocation issue, suggests that they were driven by the desire to be seen as oppos-
ing migration, rather than to substantively define EU policies (Tondo 2018). 
Similar patterns prevail with regard to populist actors’ preferences regarding sectoral EU poli-
cies such as enlargement and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). For instance, 
while both far-left and far-right French populist parties reject further EU enlargement and reg-
ularly criticize the preceding waves, the populist governments in Hungary and Italy have main-
tained their countries’ traditional support for EU enlargement to the Western Balkans. Similarly, 
some populist radical right parties (such as Germany’s Alternative fur Deutschland have called 
for the dismantling of CSDP as a form of supranational security cooperation, while others (such 
as France’s Rassemblement National support CSDP missions that promote security sector 
reforms, seeing it as a way to curb migration and terrorism. 
Finally, populist parties have criticized and contested the mainstream parties’ and EU institu-
tions’ positions and policy responses to security crises in the European neighbourhood, yet they 
have not agreed on or even suggested alternative policy courses. During the European Parlia-
ment debates on the Ukraine and Syria crises, populist parties have resorted to “vociferous rhet-
oric” while “abstaining from institutional politics”, such as the negotiations of joint motions for 
resolution (Van Berlo and Natorski 2019: 199). In other words, populist parties have challenged 
the institutionalised search for consensus in EU external relations but have not sought to affect 
the substance of policy outputs. 
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3. POPULISM AND EU STRUCTURAL 
POWER 
While populism does not typically translate into distinctive or convergent ideas about foreign 
affairs, this does not mean that the rise of populist actors in European political and policy-mak-
ing structures has had no effect on the process and substance of EU foreign policy. This impact 
has been mainly indirect and has notably pertained to the EU’s structural power and its ability to 
foster societal resilience.
This is most visible with regard to their contestations of the norms that have constituted both 
the vector and the cement of EU foreign policy. To foster peace, stability, and prosperity at its 
borders, the EU has essentially relied on the export of norms, standards, and principles of demo-
cratic governance and a free-market economy, particularly in its immediate neighbourhood. The 
objective has been to influence outcomes by shaping the political, economic, legal, and social 
structures in which states and societies evolve – the extent that the EU is sometimes referred to 
as a “normative power” and its external action as “structural foreign policy” aiming to influence 
the rules of the game and organising principles in other countries (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014; 
Laïdi 2008). 
By questioning norms of democratic governance and Rule of Law principles in their domestic 
political systems, populist governments in Hungary and Poland undermine the EU’s legitimacy 
to export them. How credible is the Polish executive in vowing to “help the People of Belarus 
build a democratic path […] via the Rule of Law” (President of Poland 2020), as it recently did in 
a joint statement with Lithuania and Romania, when it is facing a RoL infringement procedures 
from the European Commission? Illiberal policies and democratic backsliding also risk weaken-
ing the EU’s effectiveness in applying democratic conditionality in the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) and enlargement frameworks. External actors seeking to push back against the 
EU’s structural power in these regions—and to contest the international liberal order more gener-
ally—have been prompt to use these developments in their own interests. They have denounced 
“double standards” on the part of the EU and suggested that its normative principles are geopo-
litical objectives in disguise. 
In addition, populist governments in Central Europe have “frequently exploited historical or eth-
nical animosities with [their] Eastern neighbours,” as “having unstable neighbours in the East 
creates a sense of uncertainty that favours illiberal politicians” (Zielonka and Rupnik 2020: 
1090). For instance, in response to controversial language and historical policies adopted by the 
Ukrainian government, Hungary and Poland have not hesitated to block (or threaten to block) 
Ukraine’s cooperation and integration with the EU and NATO, even though they had been the 
staunchest supporters of such integration in the past (Zinets and Than 2017; Cadier and Szu-
lecki 2020).
In sum, populism as a political practice directly challenges, contradicts, or undermines the 
norms of democratic governance. As a result, it also compromises the EU’s ability, credibility, 

























4. POPULIST CONTESTATIONS AND 
ILLIBERAL POWERS: ALLIANCE IN THE 
MAKING 
Just as populist actors contest liberal norms at home and in the EU, they tend to align with the 
rhetoric of external actors contesting the international liberal order. However, there seems to be 
a gap between the discourses and the practices of populist parties when they are in power. The 
examples of Austria, Italy, and Poland show that populist parties may vocally embrace the agen-
da of illiberal international forces but then accept EU compromises, because they are reluctant 
to overly weaken their countries’ position inside the EU. That is, when in power, populist parties 
do not totally forget the logic of their national interests (Chryssogelos 2017).
For instance, the Lega/M5S governmental coalition in Italy (2018–2019) had reservations about 
the renewal of sanctions on Russia but did not block the process at the EU level. The leader 
of Lega and then Italian Minister of the Interior, Matteo Salvini —known to have close political 
relations with Putin’s United Russia party— vocally opposed the sanctions and criticised their 
negative effects on Italian businesses. In the end, though, the Italian government followed the 
mainstream EU position on the sanctions for several reasons: the preference of a technocratic 
minister of foreign affairs, Enzo Moavero, for European solutions; the opposition of the Italian 
President of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella; and the wish not to lose the Italian margin for ma-
noeuver in EU negotiations over the sanctions; a minor issue in comparison to migration policies 
and economic and monetary union.1 
Similarly, during the 2018 American re-installation of sanctions against Iran and following its 
withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), the Polish PiS government was tempted to push 
for an alignment of the EU’s position with Washington’s policy, due to the party’s fierce Atlan-
ticism and ideological affinities with the Trump administration (Sobczak 2018). In minority in 
Brussels, the Polish government has not, in the end, created opposition on a relatively minor 
issue compared to crucial EU dossiers such as the benefits of structural funds and the debates 
on RoL. 
Most often, populist parties vocalize their discontent with the international liberal order and are 
in favour of the external actors contesting it. However, when concrete and final decisions have 
to be taken, they tend to follow the views of the EU mainstream, as they regard isolation as un-
necessarily costly and foreign policy as not sufficiently important. The presence of ministers of 
foreign affairs chosen outside populist parties (as were Moavero in Italy and Kneissl in Austria) 
also favours compromises following mainstream trends on EU foreign policy. In the end, EU col-
lective responses to contestations of the international liberal order have, in practice, only been 
marginally affected by the positions of populist governments. 
1. Interviews with former members of the Italian government, Rome, 07/09/2020 and 09/09/2020.
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5. POPULIST DIPLOMACY AND EU 
FOREIGN POLICY COORDINATION 
EU foreign policy is a multi-level game which requires horizontal coordination between the differ-
ent EU institutions (especially the European Commission and the European External Action Service 
[EEAS]) and vertical coordination between the EU and the 27 member states (Lequesne 2013). From 
the beginning, it is rare that there is a convergent position on foreign policy issues among EU mem-
ber states. Finding a compromise is easier in areas of EU external relations (e.g., trade, development 
aid, and neighbourhood policy), which are decided by qualified majority voting, than in those under 
the purview of the CFSP/CSDP, which require unanimity.
Populist governments also have weak strategies of influence inside EU institutions: to affect change, 
they must go through their permanent representatives to the EU and ambassadors to the Political 
and Security Committee, who are usually diplomats able to soften the positions of their capital.2 For 
instance, in Italy and Austria, diplomats sent to Brussels are career diplomats who adhere to the 
strong corporatist culture of the foreign services, even if they have different political sensitivities. 
Lega/M5S and FPÖ parties have never been able to destroy the role of career diplomats in favour 
of pure political appointees in their respective countries.3 On the contrary, after winning the 2015 
parliamentary elections, the PiS government in Poland sidelined many career diplomats who served 
previous governments, because they were considered too lclose to the previous government and 
not loyal enough to the PiS ideology (Brzozowski 2017). As one senior official working for the Polish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, himself a political appointee of PiS, declared: “Senior diplomats posted in 
the EU or European capitals have to align with the ruling party”.4 
Most of the time, countries ruled by populist parties do not have the institutional capacity or political 
will to push the EU coordination process into a deadlock. However, this point needs to be qualified 
regarding People’s Republic of China. Along with other countries in Central Europe, Hungary and 
Poland participate in the 17+1 cooperation5, while Italy has signed a memorandum of understanding 
with China in the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).6 Considering the geo-economic 
clout of these structures, populist governments have a certain incentive to block EU coordination 
on foreign policy against China. In this context, Budapest has not hesitated to veto CFSP declara-
tions condemning China’s Human Rights record. Again, however, not all populist governments are in 
agreement regarding China. The difference in perception of the Chinese issue by M5S and Lega have 
limited M5S’s wish to proceed in ambitious agreements with China. For instance, there has not been 
any formal agreement on the harbour in Trieste, while the Chinese delegation was very interested to 
get the exploitation rights, as they did in Pyreus with the agreement of the Greek government.7 More-
over, the fact that the big member states (i.e., France, Germany, and the UK until December 2019) 
were all prepared to introduce limits to EU-China relations never allowed the populist governments to 
impose drastic changes to positions. 
2. Interview with a former Polish ambassador to the EU, Warsaw, 25/09/2020.
3. Interviews with an Austrian diplomat, Vienna 08/01/2019 and with three Italian diplomats, Rome, 08/09/2020.
4.	 Interview	with	a	Polish	Vice-Minister	or	Foreign	Affairs,	Warsaw,	25/09/2020.
5. Informal cooperation since 2012 between China and 17 countries from Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
6. Interview with a former member of Italian government, Rome, 7/09/2020.

























In sum, when it comes to EU foreign policy coordination, the impact of populist actors is limited and 
involves more nuisance power than the ability to create a deadlock. Populist governments can, however, 
block decisions on China more easily than those on Russia, and they appear more determined to do so.
CONCLUSION 
In a meeting alongside Marine Le Pen in the run-up to the 2019 EU Parliamentary elections, Matteo 
Salvini claimed that populist forces would unleash a “revolution” in Europe (France 24 2018), but 
as far as EU foreign policy is concerned, the revolution has not yet happened. Populist actors tend 
to adopt divergent and often inchoate positions on foreign policy. Although they can be vocal and 
conspicuous in rhetorically aligning with external powers that contest the international liberal order, 
populist actors rarely translate these positions into a concrete and determined policy at the EU level. 
They rarely go as far as swaying or blocking EU foreign policy decisions and outputs. 
At the same time, however, populist governments’ domestic illiberal policies have the potential to 
undermine the EU’s structural power and resilience-building endeavours. By putting norms of dem-
ocratic governance and RoL principles into question, populist governments weaken the EU’s legit-
imacy in exporting them and effectiveness in promoting flexible, fair, and transparent governance 
institutions. By relying on a divisive political rhetoric and scapegoating, they run counter to the EU’s 
efforts to promote social trust via positive interactions between social groups and inclusive social 
identities. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent populist actors’ domestic legitimacy has 
been impacted by their handling of the Covid-19 pandemic and how populist actors might affect the 
EU’s ability to deal with the world that has emerged as a result of it (Morillas 2020). 
These findings have two implications for EU foreign policy. On the one hand, in light of the discrepancy 
between populist actors’ words and deeds, it is important not to caricature their stances or exaggerate 
their influence. Sidelining or isolating populist governments in collective foreign policy-making struc-
tures and processes would thus be counter-productive: it would only feed these actors’ Eurosceptic 
discourse and agenda without changing much in terms of foreign policy outputs. On the contrary, it is 
important that representatives and diplomats from these countries remain closely integrated in these 
structures because, as highlighted in this policy paper, in political systems ruled by populist parties, ca-
reer diplomats have often acted as gatekeepers of EU foreign policy practices and principles. 
On the other hand, considering that the support of democratic governance reforms and the promotion 
of inclusive political processes and social identities is central to EU resilience-building endeavours, the 
EU and its member states cannot allow for core RoL principles to be encroached upon. Otherwise, this 
would risk undermining these endeavours and the EU’s credibility and legitimacy as a whole. There is 
thus a need to firmly reject the violation of such principles inside the EU by supporting and carrying 
out the RoL infringement procedures launched by the European Commission. This should also include 
ensuring coherence in appointments. For instance, it appears questionable for representatives from 
populist governments that have cracked down on independent media at home and turned public media 
into mouthpieces for their own political agendas to have a prominent role in EU institutions tasked with 
fighting disinformation. Deprived of such coherence in values, the EU would cease to be a foreign policy 
actor and turn into a mere diplomatic structure — as is the United Nations, where countries responsible 
for gross Human Rights violations sits the UN Human Rights Council. 
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